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Models, Race, and the Law
Moon Duchin & Douglas M. Spencer
abstract. Capitalizing on recent advances in algorithmic sampling, The Race-Blind Future of

Voting Rights explores the implications of the long-standing conservative dream of certified race
neutrality in redistricting. Computers seem promising because they are excellent at not taking race
into account—but computers only do what you tell them to do, and the rest of the authors’ apparatus for measuring minority electoral opportunity failed every check of robustness and numerical
stability that we applied. How many opportunity districts are there in the current Texas state
House plan? Their methods can give any answer from thirty-four to fifty-one, depending on invisible settings. But if we focus only on major technical flaws, we might miss the fundamental fact
that race-blind districting would devastate minority political opportunity no matter how it is deployed, just due to the mathematics of single-member districts. In the end, the Article develops an
extreme interpretation of a dubious idea proposed by Judge Easterbrook through an empirical
study that is unsupported by the methods.

introduction
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) guarantees that all American citizens,
regardless of race or ethnicity, should have an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.1 The VRA frequently interacts with single-member districts, which serve as the electoral system for congressional and nearly all state legislative races and are the go-to remedy in local VRA enforcement. It has long been known in the redistricting
literature that random boundary placement puts minorities at a major structural
disadvantage.2 Single-member districts can secure electoral opportunity for minorities, but only if the minority population is suﬃciently concentrated and the
1.

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).

2.

See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, For Single-Member Districts, Random is Not Equal, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 55, 55-58 (Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay
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boundaries are favorably aligned. The ability of the VRA to remediate historical
discrimination and underrepresentation thus depends on proactive redistricting.
As a matter of practice, when a set of districts empowers minority communities
to elect representatives in rough proportion to their population, courts have held
the promise of political equality to have been fulfilled.3 However, proportionality
has functionally operated as a ceiling even when viewed as normatively desirable: White voters will never be represented by less than their share of the population while minority communities nearly invariably will.4
In The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights (henceforth, the Article), Jowei
Chen and Nicholas Stephanopoulos sketch out a less proactive future of districting, including a mechanism that stands to needlessly sabotage minority political
power and undermine the signal remedial goal of the VRA.5 The authors devote
their Article to delineating a new baseline of opportunity provided by a randomized redistricting protocol that operates with no regard to race.6 Their project is
strategic and pragmatic, motivated by the prediction that an increasingly conservative Supreme Court is likely to eﬀect “avulsive change” for the VRA in the
near term, quite possibly by dropping any role for rough proportionality and
elevating race-blind mapping as a new ideal.7 Their Article thus seeks to provide
a roadmap for voting-rights advocates to navigate a new nominally race-blind
landscape.
To present their approach as a manageable standard, Chen and Stephanopoulos go big—modeling voter preferences in 1,903 districts and evaluating
38,000 districting plans spanning 19 states—and describe their outputs as the
race-blind baseline, full stop. Their particular setup is said to be capable of capturing the full dynamics of non-racial redistricting.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

& Howard Scarrow eds., 1982). Jowei Chen also coauthored a ground-breaking study of the
interplay of geography and this well-known majority seat bonus. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan
Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8
Q.J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013).
See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994); see also Ellen D. Katz, Margaret
Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination in
Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 643, 654-60 (2006) (documenting and analyzing section 2 decisions).
See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Relegation of Polarization, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
160, 168 (2017) (explaining that a “more accurate statement of the [dominant theory of vote
dilution] is that minority voters should be able to elect their preferred candidates to the extent
permitted by their geographic distribution up to a ceiling of proportionality”).
Jowei Chen & Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights, 130 YALE
L.J. 862 (2021).
Id.
Id. at 947.
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We find that most—though not all—enacted state-house plans
overrepresent minority voters relative to the race-blind baseline. For example, numerous plans in the Deep South include substantially more African American opportunity districts than would typically emerge from a
nonracial redistricting process, while a few plans in the Border South include fewer such districts. Similarly, several western states feature extra
Hispanic opportunity districts compared to the race-blind baseline,
while only one western state underrepresents Hispanic voters.8
As we show below, the authors’ methodology does not warrant these kinds
of conclusive statements, much less the slippage into the unmistakably normative language of over- and underrepresentation.
We certainly share the authors’ enthusiasm about the burgeoning ensemble
method. The central counterfactual problem in vote dilution law for many decades has been that of conceptualizing the undiluted baseline, or understanding
how districts might convert votes into seats in a state of nature, absent manipulation. In recent years, algorithms that generate large samples of “ensembles” of
plausible districting plans have been increasingly used to approach that question.
Using ensembles made to conform to legal rules, but without regard to race or
partisan data, can provide a non-gerrymandered baseline. Unfortunately, the approach taken by Chen and Stephanopoulos does not conform to best practices
in mathematical modeling.9
First, the authors’ ambitious scope leads them to take many shortcuts in
methodology as they build their ensembles and label of opportunity. They borrow tools from mathematical and statistical modeling (notably the randomized
districting algorithm developed in the research group that one of us runs10) but
do not provide a detailed description of their design choices; do not report any
convergence metrics to confirm that their ensembles of districting plans are representative of any particular weighting of plans; and do not provide any control
of errors that propagate through their workflow, especially through their idiosyncratic use of ecological inference.
8.

Id. at 867.
9. One attempt to model the Voting Rights Act (VRA) compliance in a Markov chain can be
found in a collaborative eﬀort by data scientists and a voting-rights attorney, see Amariah
Becker, Moon Duchin, Dara Gold & Sam Hirsch, Computational Redistricting and the Voting
Rights Act, METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GROUP (2020), https://mggg.org/VRA
[https://perma.cc/8WJ4-KRPD].
10. This Markov chain algorithm, called recombination or ReCom, is discussed at more length
infra Part III. 2 and Appendix A.1. For a detailed discussion of ReCom, see Daryl DeFord,
Moon Duchin & Justin Solomon, Recombination: A Family of Markov Chains for Redistricting,
METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GROUP (Mar. 27, 2020), https://mggg.org/ReCom
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N3Z-B5G7].
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There are quite a few junctures where their modeling decisions should be
flagged. For example, the nineteen states under consideration all have diﬀerent
statutory and constitutional rules for redistricting. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all
modeling approach cannot come close to the mark of capturing legal nuance.
This is not simply a question of whether to take each rule or principle into account, but how to operationalize that priority. For example, the legal language
around county preservation is markedly diﬀerent across these states: Texas mentions county preservation,11 North Carolina12 and Ohio13 have extremely specific
language about how to measure it, and Delaware14 and Illinois15 do not have any
county preservation rules at all. Nevertheless the same kind of (very strong)
county filter is applied by Chen and Stephanopoulos in generating districts in all
states—the details, impacts, and alternatives are left completely undiscussed
even though the particular filter they use sacrifices the properties needed for representative sampling. Perhaps more fundamentally, the authors rely on a single
presidential election to infer voter preferences—Obama versus Romney 2012—
immediately decoupling their findings from VRA practice where attorneys
would never claim to identify minority opportunity based on Obama’s reelection
numbers alone. Beyond this, the authors consider only a single plausible definition of opportunity district; they do not compare their “opportunity” label
against the ground truth of recent district performance; and they provide no significant robustness checks at any step in their modeling. Because the authors
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

TX. CONST. art. 3, § 26 (requiring that state house districts be apportioned among the counties, and that counties not be split to the extent possible).
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 250 (N.C. 2003) (interpreting Article 2 of the state
constitution that “no county shall be divided” to permit county splits for VRA compliance or
when necessary to comply with the one-person-one-vote standard so long as county groupings are minimized and resulting districts fall within five percent of population equality).
OHIO CONST. art. 19, § 2(B)(5) (“Of the eighty-eight counties in this state, sixty-five counties
shall be contained entirely within a district, eighteen counties may be split not more than
once, and five counties may be split not more than twice.”); id. § 2(B)(7) (“No two congressional districts shall share portions of the territory of more than one county, except for a
county whose population exceeds four hundred thousand.”); id. § 2(B)(8) (“The authority
drawing the districts shall attempt to include at least one whole county in each congressional
district. This division does not apply to a congressional district that is contained entirely
within one county or that cannot be drawn in that manner while complying with federal
law.”).
DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 804 (“In determining the boundaries of the several representative and
senatorial districts within the State, the General Assembly shall use the following criteria.
Each district shall, insofar as is possible: (1) Be formed of contiguous territory; (2) Be nearly
equal in population; (3) Be bounded by major roads, streams or other natural boundaries;
and (4) Not be created so as to unduly favor any person or political party.”).
ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 3(a) (“Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially
equal in population. Representative Districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially
equal in population.”).
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package their series of complex and computationally intensive functions into a
single statistic (the median number of opportunity districts) with very little discussion about their modeling choices, readers may not appreciate the extent to
which many of the ingredients are arbitrary, approximate, or numerically unstable. We unpack some of the workflow complexity in Table 2. Do these many
choices have eﬀects that cancel out in the end somehow, leaving the finding of
over- or underrepresentation intact even if the numbers shift? Do their design
choices systematically bias estimates upwards or downwards relative to what
would be possible if more elections were taken into account or state laws were
handled diﬀerently? Chen and Stephanopoulos, when they do address these
questions, do so glibly.16
Second, the authors misuse the ensembles that they do generate. Ensembles
are not suited to identifying a single ideal value of a score, as Chen and Stephanopoulos implicitly do by assigning a designation of under- or overrepresentation based on the median value alone.17 Rather, ensembles are a powerful tool for
understanding baseline ranges for valid districting plans and are useful for clarifying decisionmaking tradeoﬀs. As the Supreme Court held in 1994, “no single
statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether a set of singlemember districts unlawfully dilutes minority strength.”18 The single statistic
presented by Chen and Stephanopoulos is no exception.
One of the challenges of introducing novel technical methods in a law review
is that the blueprints that are especially important for validation—the details of
algorithm design, the magnitude of uncertainty, convergence metrics, alternative
specifications, and other robustness checks—are not likely to draw needed scrutiny from law review editors or indeed to hold the attention of most readers. The
temptation is thus to gloss over or omit these technical details altogether, even
in an eighty-six-page article and its fifty-three-page appendix. But transparency

16.

It is of course insuﬃcient to assert that design choices are applied for measuring opportunity
in both the enacted plan and its comparator maps, as the authors do. Chen & Stephanopoulos,
supra note 5, at 901 n.174 (“Any idiosyncrasies in our particular ecological inference run are
reflected in the numbers of opportunity districts we report for both the enacted plans and the
simulated [sic] maps.”). We demonstrate this inadequacy in infra Figure 5, where we show
that instability may aﬀect the measurement of the enacted plan while leaving the ensemble
unchanged.
17. For a discussion of their reliance on the median, see infra Section II.2. It was sleight of hand
of just this kind—treating a single number based on piles of political modeling choices as an
authoritative indicator—that earned the memorable label of sociological gobbledygook. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161) (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . the whole point is you’re taking these issues away from democracy and
you’re throwing them into the courts pursuant to, and it may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.”).
18. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020-21 (1994).
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is all the more important for a project that has not been subject to rigorous peer
review. This worry about law review publication is not new. Nearly twenty years
ago, Lee Epstein and Gary King wrote an important piece in which they reviewed
the legal literature and sounded the alarm that “the current state of empirical legal
scholarship is deeply flawed.”19 The lack of attention to sound methodology, they
warned, would lead readers to “learn considerably less accurate information
about the empirical world than the studies’ stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions suggest.”20
This is exactly what generates our grave concerns about the current Article
and its placement in a flagship law review. Chen and Stephanopoulos’s style of
leveraging technical tools while ignoring the scientific standards surrounding
their development and deployment risks creating an unnecessarily muddy legal
terrain. And the stakes are high: they have provided a recipe that may well devastate electoral opportunity for minority groups just as public opinion and voting behavior are pushing the other way.
In sum, we find that The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights is a provocative
proof of concept that stands on a shaky empirical foundation. The Article uses
the promising ensemble method of random district generation to deliver a baseline
for minority electoral opportunity; this Response both flags technical issues and
questions the conceptual alignment of the methods with their application to voting rights law.
Overview
In Part I we will discuss the nonlinear eﬀects of winner-take-all districting,
explaining that the mathematics of districts induces a major representational disadvantage for any group in the numerical minority. Minority groups are therefore systematically disfavored by single-member districts just as they are by atlarge plurality voting. The law must take up the challenge of counteracting these
eﬀects for groups that are protected from disparate treatment. We argue that the
diﬃcult task of remedial district design becomes excruciating if we gauge success
by standards that ignore, or at least proclaim to ignore, the very feature that triggers the obligation to protect.
In Part II we trace the intuition that algorithmic methods can generate a
baseline for voting-right opportunity through law and policy literature, culminating in the proposal by Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit that is
cited as motivation by Chen and Stephanopoulos. We outline the promise of

19.
20.

Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002).
Id. at 6-7.
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ensembles to address foundational questions about vote dilution, and we illustrate why the median should not be elevated to an ideal, as is strongly implied
by the authors’ labels of under- and overrepresentation.
In Part III we describe the logic of building ensembles using Markov chain
Monte Carlo, or MCMC. The main benefit of using MCMC to find a baseline is
that it is built to draw representative samples of all valid districting plans according
to a desired weighting, or “target distribution.” A mere sample, with no information about its distribution, oﬀers no evidence at all—total agreement among
your Facebook friends does not say much about national public opinion. A close
read of the Article coupled with a close inspection of the authors’ replication materials reveals their conflation of various methodologies and their inattention to
bottlenecks that block their ability to sample in a representative manner.
In Part IV we provide several concrete data demonstrations that test the
soundness of the Article’s findings, using Texas as an illustrative example. We
find that a significant driver of instability is the manner of employing ecological
inference (EI) to estimate candidate preference by race. Though EI is a valid
family of estimation methods, it should be used with caution because of welldocumented limitations in precision and untestable questions of model selection.21 The authors do not defend their EI modeling choices or include any uncertainty estimates, generating instability that propagates through their workflow and implicates their analysis. For example, we count fifty-one seats (of 150)
in the Texas state House that have demonstrably provided electoral opportunity
for minority candidates of choice following the 2010 Census. Chen and Stephanopoulos report that forty-six seats currently meet their definition of minority
opportunity district (MOD). But merely toggling four settings between the authors’ EI setup and alternative setups we commonly find in expert reports—
while maintaining their precise definition of MOD and using the same R package they used to run EI—we were able to make the measured number of opportunity districts in the enacted plan itself vary from thirty-four to fifty-one seats,
as shown in Figure 5. This does not mean that EI should be discarded, but its
role in the Article’s definition of MOD is far too central and too hard-edged. A
definition that uses richer electoral history would be far more robust and more
meaningful than one built by pushing a single election through a black box of
statistical inference.
In Part V we conclude with a look to the future, in which algorithms are fast
becoming intertwined with governance. This brings cutting-edge scientific com-

21.
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See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa J. Abrajano, Racially Polarized
Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 672-73 (2016); D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 86 IND. L. J. 447, 463-65 (2011).
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putation more and more into to the legal mainstream, which both provides collaborative opportunities and an increasing onus to handle legal questions with
scientific best practices.
Research Acknowledgement
A wide-ranging and fast-paced empirical research eﬀort, such as was necessary to compile this Response, is not possible without a team. From our capable
team of staﬀ and aﬃliates of the MGGG Redistricting Lab at Tufts University
who were thanked above, we want to particularly acknowledge the extraordinarily talented Parker Rule and Gabe Schoenbach. They did a deep dive in the replication materials, curated data, wrote our parallel test code in R and Python and
Julia, and collaborated on the design of all experiments to make this Response
possible.
i. the race-blind future?
A. The Scope of Proactive Protection
Race plays a singular role in American election law. Despite a constitutional
prohibition against race discrimination in voting as early as 1870, discrimination
has stubbornly persisted and so race has remained a key fault line in the development, implementation, and interpretation of election laws. From overtly racist
literacy tests22 and felon disenfranchisement23 to more subtle forms of vote dilution,24 voting laws have long limited the political participation and political
power of communities of color and other minority groups across the country.
Some of the reasons for systematic underrepresentation are structural and
function independently of gerrymandering. A chief example is at-large plurality
voting, which is still used to elect many city councils, county commissions, and
other local bodies across the country. In this system, any group with a majority
22.

See, e.g., Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aﬀ ’d, 336 U.S. 933 (1949)
(holding Alabama’s literacy test unconstitutional because “its main object was to restrict voting on a basis of race or color”).
23. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (striking down a felon-disenfranchisement
provision in Alabama’s state constitution because it “was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks”).
24. Some examples of more subtle forms of racial discrimination in voting include moving from
single-member districts to at-large voting or vice versa, changing elected positions to appointed positions, prohibiting “bullet voting,” and vote dilution via cracking and packing
when redistricting. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah Cty. Cmm’n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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can capture every seat at the expense of all other groups. Indeed, one reason why
Congress mandated that members of the House of Representatives be chosen
from single-member districts in 184225 was to provide for a system of representation that would produce outcomes more in line with voter preference between
the political parties; that is, to produce more proportional outcomes.
But winner-take-all districting itself tends to deal out representation far
short of proportionality to virtually all minorities, from environmentalists in
Alaska to Republicans in Massachusetts, as a matter of mathematics.26 In fact, if
district lines are drawn at random, a minority constituting one quarter of the
population will frequently be entirely deprived of the control of even a single
district.27 Minority representation in a districted system thus depends on proactive measures. These proactive measures cannot simultaneously save every conceivable minority from underrepresentation or outright exclusion, which raises
two crucial questions: First, which minorities, if any, deserve proactive protection? And second, how much action is necessary to oﬀset the structural barriers
to representation faced by these minorities?
The short answer to the first question is that racial minorities have long been
singled out for particular attention. The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution explicitly prohibits the government from denying or abridging the
right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”28
More generally, federal courts have identified race as a protected class. Owing to
the long and often violent history of discrimination against racial minorities,
their general political underrepresentation, and the legal determination that race
is an immutable trait, the Supreme Court set out a mandate in the mid-1900s to
attend to disparate treatment of racial groups in a wide range of contexts.29 This

25.

An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives Among the Several States According to the
Sixth Census, 5 Stat. 491 (1842).
26. The political-science literature on this topic, where this eﬀect goes by the name of a “winner’s
bonus” or “seat bonus” for the majority, is too large to survey here. For just one important
example, see Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1997). For a few other key themes in the literature, see
Moon Duchin, Taissa Gladkova, Eugene Henninger-Voss, Ben Klingensmith, Heather Newman & Hannah Wheelen, Locating the Representational Baseline: Republicans in Massachusetts,
18 ELECTION L.J. 388 (2019).
27. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. See generally Duchin et al., supra note 26.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
29.
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See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say
that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”); United States v. Carolene Prods.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (calling for a “more searching judicial inquiry” in cases where the
ordinary political process fails to address prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities”).
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“strict scrutiny” standard immediately places courts in a skeptical posture with
respect to any government policy that creates racial diﬀerences. Against this
backdrop, Congress has also mandated specific race-based protections for voting, first in the Civil Rights Acts of 187030 and 187131 that created a right of action
in cases of bribery, intimidation, or violence aimed at deterring individuals from
voting based on their race, and provided severe fines and jail time for violations.
Civil Rights Acts in 1957,32 1960,33 and 196434 also protected against state and
local voting laws that would discriminate along racial lines. Congress has yet to
extend the same promise or protections to women, environmentalists, the poor,
left-handed citizens, or other groups that are minorities or minoritized.35
B. Proportionality and Its Discontents
Recognizing the special legal status of racial minorities leaves open the question of how much proactive protection is needed to oﬀset the systematic subproportional eﬀects of single-member districting. The Voting Rights Act of 1965,
arguably the most important proactive voting measure ever enacted in the
United States, dictates that racial minorities should have an equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. The
ultimate goal of the VRA is to shield elections from racial discrimination and to
ensure eﬀective minority representation at all levels of government.36
Chen and Stephanopoulos provide a detailed and accessible account of how
courts adopted a comparator of “rough[] proportional[ity]” to evaluate whether
minority political opportunity is equal to that of Whites.37 In theory, a standard
of rough proportionality might push legislators and other districting bodies to
draw lines in a way that puts a near-proportional share of seats in reach for minority-preferred candidates to the greatest extent possible. As the Article notes,
however, the rough proportionality standard has operated instead as a ceiling on

30.

16 Stat. 140.
17 Stat. 13.
32. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
31.

33.

Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 869.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
35. See, e.g., Helen Mayer Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30 SOC. FORCES 60 (1951).
36. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections,
and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 395-96 (2012).
37. Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 872-75.
34.
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minority opportunity.38 In other words, the status quo of VRA practice has ensured that White voters will never be represented by less than their share of the
population while minority voters almost always will. But even a proportionality
target is far from a perfect realization of the loftiest goals of the VRA. The proper
goal of the VRA is real political power for minority groups, which is a stubbornly
local and particular matter, and is therefore hard to capture in a mere count of
districts that pass any quantitative threshold test.39
These weaknesses in the VRA status quo are not what drives the authors to
explore a race-blind alternative. Instead, they focus on a diﬀerent set of critiques
to motivate their project.40 Though a proportionality standard is intuitive and
easy to measure,41 the Court has warned that it can lead to conflation of political
outcomes with political opportunities,42 and critics argue that it puts undue
stress on race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 These critics also note that drawing designer districts to approach proportionality can result in noncompact districts that split counties and
cities.44

38.

39.

40.
41.

42.
43.

44.
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Id. at 919 (referring to the proportionality baseline as “an upper limit to how much representation minority groups can legally claim”); see also Katz et al., supra note 3; Stephanopoulos,
supra note 4, at 168 (explaining that a “more accurate statement of the theory [of rough proportionality] is that minority voters should be able to elect their preferred candidates to the
extent permitted by their geographic distribution up to a ceiling of proportionality”).
See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 573, 578 (2016) (“Proper focus on local nuance and meaningful political power—as
precedent demands—can restore the Voting Rights Act to a vehicle for fighting both racial
discrimination and racial essentialism.”).
Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 877-81.
See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 928 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgement) (referring to proportional representation as “the most logical ratio for assessing a claim of vote
dilution” and noting that other standards would have “less intuitive appeal”); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 84 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A]ny theory of vote dilution
must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes
some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.”).
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (“[M]inority voters are not immune from
the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.”).
See Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 872 (citing to Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), and the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657 (1993), which referred to remedial racial districting as “political apartheid” that may
“balkanize us into competing racial factions”).
See Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 875.
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The authors do not confront the critiques of proportionality-based standards
in any depth, nor do they endorse them.45 They perceive no obligation to argue
that any standard for interpreting the VRA is better than any other, including
the novel standard that they articulate at great length: “to be clear, in this Article,
we are not advocating for any particular legal interpretation of the VRA.”46 Instead, “we are merely analyzing the empirical consequences of the hypothetical
adoption of a race-blind baseline for minority representation under section 2.”47
Because Chen and Stephanopoulos are so restrained in articulating their normative stance, some will read their Article in line with their stated intent: as
purely descriptive of the racial landscape, taking the idea of race-blind districting
literally and seriously to its conclusions. However, other readers may not find
the treatment so neutral, instead reading the Article as an endorsement of the
approach that it delineates, at least as a compromise that saves the VRA from a
complete dismantlement by the Roberts Court. Few readers are likely to take the
authors to be warning of the potential of dire consequences to this particular
computer-centric approach.
C. The Limits of Race-Blindness
This neglected question—can the aims of the VRA be served by a race-blind
baseline?—should be seen as a pressing matter, since the goal of the VRA is to
“hasten the waning of racism in American politics”48 and the protocol delineated
in The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights could very well hasten the waning of
political power for people of color at all levels of government instead.49
Battling the antiminoritarian tendencies of districts to generate adequate opportunity for minority groups, all without attention race, is a challenge indeed.50
In the current regime, this often leads to elaborate post hoc claims of having

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

The authors oﬀer a brief summary of potential responses in footnotes 56, 63, and 70 but remain studiously agnostic about the merits. Id. at 881 (“To be clear, we do not endorse the
conservative objections to the proportionality baseline.”).
Id. at 870 n.21.
Id.
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 922-23 (noting the “dramatic implications” of a raceblind baseline, one where “most Section 2 suits seeking the formation of new opportunity
districts would fail”).
For a discussion of the tension between requirements that race discrimination be intentional
while remedies be blind to race, see, for example, Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
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“backed in” to a satisfactory demographic arrangement across districts by happy
circumstance, in a kind of race-blind theater.51
As we explain in the next Part, the power of the ensemble method is to hold
the human and political geography of a jurisdiction fixed while varying district
lines. It therefore has the unique capacity to measure the extent of the control
exercised by the mapmaker. But laying randomized lines over fixed human geography bakes in the eﬀects of residential patterns which may themselves be
driven by discriminatory policy and which certainly reflect histories of racism
and prejudice. Residential patterns have an enormous impact on the landscape
of possible districted outcomes.
Does the human geography interact with the system of election in a way that
enables minority groups to be agentic—to have an opportunity to elect? Instead
of being satisfied with letting the chips fall where they may with respect to the
interactions of residential segregation and compact, contiguous, equipopulous
districts, the logic of the VRA requires us to interrogate the system itself. That is
because districts may indeed secure adequate opportunity, but only when mindfully drawn. If proactive districting is too race-conscious for the twenty-first century Court, as Chen and Stephanopoulos predict, then plurality districts themselves must be reconsidered. We do not share Chen and Stephanopoulos’s view
that race-blind benchmarks are “the only alternative to proportionality currently
on the table.”52
Finally, the “race-blind” approach outlined by the authors is anything but
blind. To check compliance in their framework (confirming that a proposed map
is at the 50th percentile of a batch of neutral alternatives in its number of MODs)
requires a detailed use of racial data and the same ecological inference machinery
that is used in the measurement of racial polarization in the Gingles framework

51.

For other examples of VRA theater, in which redistricting actors proclaim one set of datadriven aims while targeting another set of political and racial aims, see Levitt supra note 39 at
605, which notes that “a state may have incorrectly attempted to comply with section 2 and
yet still have drawn lines that provide an equal opportunity for minority voters to elect candidates of choice;” and Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams,
J., dissenting), which criticizes the reverse-engineered coverage formula in § 4(b) of the VRA
by noting that “sometimes a skilled dart-thrower can hit the bull’s eye throwing a dart backwards over his shoulder . . . . Congress hasn’t proven so adept.”
52. Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 877; see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 121 (1994) (“It’s districting in general—not race-conscious districting in particular—that
is the problem.”). Guinier and others have looked to alternative voting systems precisely for
their promise in this regard, and ranked-choice voting in particular is currently seeing a surge
of interest, from Maine to Alaska. Gerdus Benade, Ruth Buck, Moon Duchin, Dara Gold &
Thomas Weighill, Ranked Choice Voting and Minority Representation, METRIC GEOMETRY &
GERRYMANDERING GROUP, https://mggg.org/RCV [https://perma.cc/9995-RN7X].
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that the authors profess to leave behind. So even checking compliance requires
statistical modeling of vote preferences by race. This makes doing so race-conscious in far deeper ways than the mere use of population proportionality and
trades a simple and manageable barometer for a complicated and contestable alternative. This new alternative relies on more than just the measurement of political preferences by race; the second major ingredient is the comparator ensemble of valid plans. We turn to that methodology now.
ii. ensemble methods: arguing from alternatives
An ensemble of plans is a collection, or sample, from among all possible districting plans. If the purpose of an ensemble is to serve as a basis for comparison,
then it should be fashioned so as to be representative of the universe of valid
plans. As we will discuss in the next Part, this requires that the samples are drawn
with a clear weighting, and that the samples are large enough to draw sound
statistical conclusions.
Plans are typically assessed by summary statistics, like the number of seats
with a Democratic advantage, the number of competitive seats, one of a variety
of compactness scores, or, here, the number of “minority opportunity districts.”
These statistics can be integer-valued, like anything denominated in seats or districts, or they can be essentially continuous, like many of the compactness metrics or the eﬃciency-gap partisan metric. If we focus on a single statistic and record the value achieved by each plan, ensembles will often generate a bell-shaped
distribution. That familiar bell curve visual can help us think through what is
the normal range and what is vanishingly rare in the universe we have specified.
The bulk of that distribution can be treated as a baseline range for the statistic.
The tails of the curve contain the outliers—finding that a plan falls in the vanishing outer reaches of the sample is a strong indicator that some element of the
mapmaker’s intent was not accounted for in the ensemble design.
In other words, ensembles generate empirical distributions that have descriptive power. Districting ensembles do not answer our normative questions
for us, although they can be extraordinarily useful for addressing normative inquiries. For example, some states have enshrined in their rules the norm that
political agents should not be excessively or “unduly” partisan when drawing
districts.53 To investigate whether a plan is in line with this norm, we can survey
the summary statistics for an ensemble of partisan-neutral plans (i.e., made with
zero partisan data). Some proposed plans will have partisan properties that are
typical of the ensemble, while others will fall in the long tails of the empirical
distribution. The ensemble furnishes evidence for evaluation by the lights of the
53.

See, e.g., supra note 14 (Delaware code).
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norm without ever providing a normative ideal by imagining that there is some
most partisan-neutral plan.54
Many norms for redistricting are framed negatively or proscriptively: race
should not predominate over traditional districting principles;55 voting rights
should not be denied or abridged on account of race;56 the shapes of districts
should not be bizarre, eccentric, or irrational.57 But very few of these thou-shaltnots come with a corresponding “shalt” that has any clarity or precision. An exception is overall malapportionment, where population equality across districts
is the positive norm. Vote dilution on the basis of group membership is a crucial
instance of the lack of a prescribed ideal. Since at least the 1940s, courts have
struggled to discover an undiluted baseline for the weight of a vote: What is the
neutral state of aﬀairs, absent gerrymandering?58
In practice, this means that ensembles are useful for identifying whether a
particular districting plan might be disallowed according to statutory or constitutional guidance because it distributes the group members across the districts
in a way that is far out of line with the neutral tendencies of geographic partitions.59 Using ensembles to flag outliers does not commit us to any view on
which of two competing options from the bulk of the ensemble is better or closer
to ideal. In particular we will argue that the mean (average), the median (50th
percentile), or the mode (most frequent) values of any statistic derived from an
ensemble have no inherent claim on quality. In part, this is because only a subset
of the rules is amenable to quantification, and therefore can be taken into account
by algorithmic methods. We can certainly search for what is most typical or most

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

758

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2518-19 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)).
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976-81 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993).
See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663,
1723 (2001) (“The right to an undiluted vote does not fit easily into either a group rights or
an individual rights category. While it is certainly true that an individual’s right is linked to
the status of the group, that is because the injury being asserted by an individual is the inability to aggregate her vote. The only way to measure that individual harm is to evaluate the position of other group members with whom she wishes to coalesce.”).
This “outlier analysis” has been the focus of recent litigation about partisan gerrymandering
in state and federal courts. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2517-18 (2019)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plaintiﬀs demonstrated the districting plan’s eﬀects mostly by
relying on what might be called the ‘extreme outlier approach.’”); League of Women Voters
v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 828 (Pa. 2018) (Baer, J., concurring in part) (“[A] petitioner
may establish that partisan considerations predominated in the drawing of the map by, inter
alia, introducing expert analysis and testimony that the adopted map is a statistical outlier in
contrast with other maps drawn utilizing traditional districting criteria.”).
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frequent under blind application of the quantifiable subset of the rules, but we
would need significant additional reasons to hold it up as ideal.
A. Judge Easterbrook’s Dream and Its Antecedents
The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights builds its analysis on a proposal of
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook. Judge Easterbrook’s own formulation in Gonzalez
v. City of Aurora begins with algorithmic ensembles: “Today, however, computers
can use census data to generate many variations on compact districts with equal
population.”60 From there, both outlier logic and the primacy of the median get
billing:
Suppose that after 1,000 diﬀerent maps of Aurora’s wards have been generated, 10% have two or three “safe” districts for Latinos and the other
90% look something like the actual map drawn in 2002: one safe district
and two “influence districts” where no candidate is likely to win without
substantial Latino support. Then we could confidently conclude that Aurora’s map did not dilute the eﬀectiveness of the Latino vote. But suppose, instead, that Latinos are suﬃciently concentrated that the random,
race-blind exercise we have proposed yields three “Latino eﬀective” districts at least 50% of the time. Then a court might sensibly conclude that
Aurora had diluted the Latino vote by undermining the normal eﬀects of
the choices that Aurora’s citizens had made about where to live.61
More than thirty years earlier (and in a diﬀerent spirit), Bernard Grofman,
Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello anticipated the same logical move in
1985, complete with the computational turn—only with the mode in place of the
median:
Social scientists have developed computer methods to create hypothetical
single-member-district plans satisfying specified constraints. By generating a large number of such plans, we can determine the expected racial
representation under the modal single-member-districting scheme and
compare a minority group’s actual or anticipated ability to elect representation of its choice under the actual plan with the outcomes expected under neutrally drawn smd plans.62

60.

535 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008).

61.

Id. at 600.
Bernard Grofman, Michael Migalski & Nicholas Noviello, The “Totality of Circumstances Test”
in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective, 7 LAW &
POL’Y 199, 216 (1985).

62.
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And even a few years before that, the landmark 1982 paper of James Blacksher and Larry Menefee, from which the Supreme Court plucked the Gingles factors in short order, laid out a remarkably similar vision but with a still diﬀerent
spin:
[T]he relevant question should be whether the minority population is so
concentrated that, if districts were drawn pursuant to accepted nonracial
criteria, there is a reasonable possibility that at least one district would
give the racial minority a voting majority.63
For this purpose, the authors tell us, “computer-assisted mathematical models”
would be suﬃcient but are not necessary to answer the question.64
It is worth noting that Judge Easterbrook’s use of the median leaves room for
shades of gray: if the median has three eﬀective districts and the proposed plan
has one eﬀective and two mere influence districts, he tells us that signs point to
dilution. But what if the median plan has two safe districts and one barely over
the eﬀectiveness threshold, while the proposed plan has two safe districts and
one barely under the eﬀectiveness threshold. Is this as clear a case? Judge Easterbrook does not tell us what a court might sensibly conclude. But the ChenStephanopoulos framework, because it works in integers and yes/no answers,
declares this to be a full-fledged case of underrepresentation in the proposed
plan. Phrased diﬀerently: Judge Easterbrook only comes to conclusions when a
proposed plan is suﬃciently far from the median. He does not tell us whether to
prefer the median to its near neighbors or how far from the median a plan can
permissibly be.
In another example, Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho also calls on an ensemble median for judging partisan gerrymanders. “And we can see where the State’s
actual plan falls on the spectrum—at or near the median or way out on one of
the tails? The further out on the tail, the more extreme the partisan distortion
and the more significant the vote dilution.”65
Against this background, Chen and Stephanopoulos have elected to rely
heavily on the median values of their ensembles for their top-line conclusions.
For example, they report that Alabama’s twenty-seven black opportunity districts “exceeds by four the number of black opportunity districts in the median
63.

James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden:
Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 56 n.330
(1982).
64. Id.
65. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2518 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Moon
Duchin, How to Reason from the Universe of Maps (The Normative Logic of Map Sampling), ELECTION L. BLOG (July 5, 2019), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=106069 [https://perma.cc
/2WQJ-3BMU].
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simulated map,”66 that “the enacted plan [in Illinois] has twenty-one black opportunity districts: two more than the midpoint of the simulations,”67 and that
“the enacted plan [in Florida], on the other hand, has seven [Hispanic opportunity] districts, or three fewer than the midpoint of the simulations.”68 With this
choice they go farther than any of these previous authors, including Easterbrook
himself. The median stands alone with no notion of a baseline range; it is held
up as a standard from which plans that deviate by even one legislative seat will
receive a label of over- or underrepresentation.69 This slippage from a negative
to a narrow positive norm for ensemble methods leads to strange conclusions.
B. The Tyranny of the Median
To see why a strong focus on the median value is problematic, suppose we
have a coin and we want to determine if it is a “fair coin”—that is, whether it is
equally weighted between heads and tails or exhibits a structural bias toward one
or the other outcome. There is a basic test for this: we flip the coin repeatedly
and record the results. To fix terminology, let’s say a trial is made by conducting
1000 coin flips and recording the number of heads, so that the possible outcomes
range from 0 to 1000. The evidence provided by one trial about whether the coin
is fair is similar to the evidence provided by superimposing one set of election
results on a districting plan and recording the plan’s summary statistics.

66.

Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 906 (emphasis added).
Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 914-18 fig. 13 & app. C tbl. 1.
67.
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FIGURE 1.
coinflip trials70

TABLE 1.
trials of 1,000 flips71
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564
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482
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456

445

432

428

415
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70.

This histogram shows the outcome of 100,000 simulation trials with a true fair coin, approximating a familiar bell curve. If we want to test four coins for fairness, suppose we flip each
one 1,000 times. Coin 1 gives 504 heads; Coin 2 gives 508 heads; Coin 3 gives 473 heads; and
Coin 4 gives 586 heads. What can we conclude?
71. Each column is a sample of outcomes from repeated trials with an actually fair coin (up to the
limits of a computer’s ability to randomize). The more trials in our sample, the more predictable the results. (Note that if there is a tie for the most frequently observed value, the smallest
of these values is reported as the mode.)
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We would be justified in concluding that a coin that flipped heads 586 times
out of 1000 is unlikely to be fair. But if my coin came up heads 508 times and
your coin came up heads 504 times, we would not be reasonably able to conclude
that your coin is fairer than mine. This would be an error: rather, both coins
have behavior that is consistent with fairness, since the outcomes are well within
the reasonable range for a fair coin. Even stranger would be to require that any
legally permissible fair coin should pass the test of having exactly 500 heads in
its oﬃcial trial—after all, this occurs only about 2.5% of the time even for a perfectly fair coin.
This fuzziness is of course inconvenient in the search for a manageable legal
standard: clear goals and clear thresholds are preferable when possible. But elevating the median number, and suppressing talk of a reasonable range of outcomes, leads to fundamental problems.
C. Example: Distribution of the Black Voting Age Population (BVAP)
To see ensembles in action and their power to illustrate the interplay between
human geography and the mathematics of districts, we turn to our first data
demonstration.72 Chen and Stephanopoulos set out to study twenty states (but
ultimately excluded New Jersey due to unexplained “unreliable ecological-inference estimates”).73 For each of those twenty states and each level of districting,
we have created two million districting plans that are compact and contiguous,
with each district always within 2% of ideal size, using the method described in
the next Part of this Response.74 Figure 2 shows the counts of majority-Black
districts observed in those plans, vividly illustrating the war between proportionality and plurality districts.75 Not once in 114,000,000 attempts across the

72.

All ensembles that we generate in this Response use the implementation of ReCom in the
high-performance programming language Julia, which is publicly available at GerryChain,
GITHUB, https://github.com/mggg/GerryChainJulia [https://perma.cc/C82D-UNZF].
73. Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 890, n.145. The pressures of the authors’ one-sizefits-all modeling begin to show with these kinds of exceptions. The authors also hard-code
various exceptional cases in their programs, for instance by manually loosening the intactcounty threshold and the compactness threshold in some states.
74. For these runs, we use ensembles built from Census block groups, since we do not need electoral data. We have provided confirmation data from selected states showing that using
blocks, block groups, or precincts gives similar results.
75. The shaded range shows the seats outcomes ever observed in the ensemble, regardless of its
frequency, and whole numbers of districts are shown as small dots. As an example, of the two
million maps made for Louisiana’s congressional delegation, just six districting plans included
a majority-Black district. The remaining 1,999,994 plans had zero majority-minority dis-
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states and levels did a plan made with no regard to race have a number of majority-Black districts that is proportional to the state’s Black population share. And
in fact for Alabama (seven districts), Louisiana (six districts), Mississippi (four
districts), and South Carolina (seven districts), all with Black populations over
25%, the median number of majority-Black congressional districts is zero.76
Strikingly, in Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina, the median is still zero
even if we shift the frame to districts with 40% Black population (Figure 3). This
is the sense in which random districts are punishing to minorities—they can often produce statistics not that diﬀerent from the state overall, and will not happen on higher concentrations unless by design.

tricts. Despite its extremely low frequency, Figure 2 includes this one seat. This is a good reminder that sub-sampling, or skipping over many plans to thin the ensemble, may not be the
best practice for these ensemble applications, even though it is frequently used in other domains of applied statistics. If we only sample every 10,000 plans visited by the random walk,
we may miss rare events entirely and subvert the exploration features of Markov chain sampling.
76. We also note that as the granularity of districting gets finer (more and smaller districts, like
in state Houses), the range of seat-share outcomes observed in a neutral ensemble is reliably
narrower, but the mean and median seat-share creep higher. Jonathan Rodden and Thomas
Weighill have a similar finding that increased granularity results in lower variance in their
study of scale eﬀects in Pennsylvania districting. However, fascinatingly, they find that in the
specific case of Pennsylvania and a partisan measure rather than the racial measure considered
here, the ensemble average is stable at every scale—there is no “sweet spot” of district size for
Democrats in Pennsylvania. Jonathan Rodden & Thomas Weighill, Political Geography and
Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania, in POLITICAL GEOMETRY (Moon
Duchin & Olivia Walch eds., forthcoming 2021), https://mggg.org/gerrybook [https://
perma.cc/LV7B-VCKN].
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FIGURE 2.
districts with bvap greater than 50%77

77.

Figure 2 depicts shortfalls from proportionality, viewed with comparator ensembles of two
million districting plans for Congress (top), state Senate (middle), and state House (bottom).
Blue line: proportionality (BVAP share). Bracket: share of majority-Black districts (BVAP
> 50%) in enacted plan. Colored dots and range: share of majority-Black districts in neutral
ensemble plans, with large dot marking median. Note: Delaware has a single seat in the U.S.
House of Representatives and is thus not included in the top panel. Arizona and Maryland
employ multimember districts in their state lower House and are thus not included in the
bottom panel.
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FIGURE 3.
districts with bvap greater than 40%78

78.

766

Figure 3 depicts Congressional (top), state Senate (middle), and state House (bottom) districting and Black population. Blue line: proportionality (BVAP share). Bracket: share of districts with BVAP > 40% in enacted plan. Colored dots and range: share of districts with
BVAP > 40% in neutral ensemble plans, with large dot marking median. Note: Delaware has
a single seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and is thus not included in the top panel.
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The design caveat is important: it is fairly easy to make majority-Black districts if one tries, and the figure shows that enacted plans are often right at the
top of the ensemble, or higher still.79 This comports with many observers’ suspicion that states often use the crude device of demographic percentage as a substitute for a more nuanced VRA compliance.80 It just does not happen by chance.
This showing is unsurprising—it has long been understood that randomness
does not lend itself well to creating pluralities from minority populations,81 as
we continue to remind the reader—but the extent and consistency is remarkable.
With BVAP > 40% districts in view instead of BVAP > 50%, the story changes
dramatically. Suddenly, neutral ensembles can smash through the proportionality ceiling and the ensemble routinely includes plans that outmatch the enacted
plans. But this is only if we refuse to maintain a laser focus on the median.
Demographics are not voting destiny and below, following the VRA itself,
we will shift the focus to electoral eﬀectiveness rather than raw demographics. But
we will still have no more reason for believing that the ensemble median is ideal
or fair than we do here.
iii. ensuring representative samples
A. Samples, Not Simulations
Chen and Stephanopoulos repeatedly refer to their districting plans “simulations” as they have in previous articles and litigation materials.82 We start by
reorienting the language to help highlight the task at hand.

79.

80.

81.
82.

Arizona and Maryland employ multimember districts in their state lower House and are thus
not included in the bottom panel.
It is crucial to remember that if race is considered among proactive redistricting goals, it is
easy to outperform a neutral algorithm, and indeed it is often easy to outperform the enacted
plans. For an automated search technique for majority-minority districts, see Sarah Cannon,
Ari Goldbloom-Helzner, Varun Gupta, JN Matthews & Bhushan Suwal, Voting Rights, Markov
Chains, and Optimization by Short Bursts, ARXIV (2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02288
[https://perma.cc/LL95-A7FU].
Justin Levitt particularly and sharply observes this. See Levitt, supra note 39, at 575-76 (“In
some circumstances, the jurisdictions’ reliance on crude demographic targets over-concentrates real minority political power; in other circumstances, it under-concentrates real minority political power. In still other circumstances, the real political eﬀects are unclear, because
the lure of the demographic assumption means that nobody has bothered to examine the real
political eﬀects.” (internal citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Grofman, supra note 2.
See Jowei Chen, The Impact of Political Geography on Wisconsin Redistricting: An Analysis of
Wisconsin’s Act 43 Assembly Districting Plan, 16 ELECTION L.J. 443 (2017); Jowei Chen & David
Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Eﬀect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329
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When a measurement of a physical or agent-based event is not possible directly, when we wish to abstract out some inconvenient features that make measurement messy, or when we wish to repeat trials more times than there are available observations, we must make use of a simplified simulation event, often
outsourced to a computer. The coinflip model from the last section is a simulation: the random number generator in Python is abstracting the physical flip of
a fair coin. When you have a model of voter behavior and you run it many times,
you are conducting a simulated election, since no votes were actually cast. When
you use red and blue squares to model the states of magnets and set up a lattice
of them to look for interactions, you are simulating a magnetic field.
On the other hand, a partition of Census blocks into connected pieces is not
a simulated districting plan; it is an actual districting plan. If you generate many
of these, you are sampling from the universe of possible districting plans. Calling
this process simulation sets up a mistaken (if popular) analogy with statistical
physics and agent-based modeling. Our proposed language shift comes with a
salutary reminder: if the goal is representative sampling of plausible, valid plans,
this brings with it a clear mandate to weight the observations appropriately so
as to counteract various forms of sampling bias. We will see that the Article thoroughly conflates several conceptually distinct things that computers can do: provide examples, seek plans with better scores of some kind, or attempt representative sampling.
B. Random Walks and “Recombination”
Imagine the universe of all possible connected, population-balanced districting plans that satisfy the state’s requirements. It turns out that this space of valid
plans is quite large. Justice Alito memorably mused that there might be a hundred, even thousands of alternatives.83 In fact, the number of competing plans
in a full-scale redistricting problem smashes past trillions and is likely in the
range of googols (10100), which means that a comprehensive survey of these
plans is impossible, even for a quantum computer.
While it cannot be fully constructed, this vast space can still be explored. The
mathematics literature provides an enormously useful tool called Markov chains:
iterative processes that explore a state space (a universe of all possibilities) using

(2016); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations
and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2015).
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (No. 18422) (“I think you probably have thousands.”).
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a transition rule for moving from position to position.84 In scientific applications, there is a suite of practical Markov chain techniques going by the name of
MCMC, or Markov chain Monte Carlo. In MCMC, scientists typically prescribe
a desirable target distribution where some of the measurable attributes are
weighted in a known way, then collect samples to observe the values of other
attributes.85 This is ideal for the redistricting use case. We can survey the local
rules of redistricting and design a distribution tailored to the requirements and
preferences encoded in the rules. For instance, in our runs below, we will treat
contiguity as a requirement: all plans must have connected districts. On the
other hand, we will treat compactness as a preference: districts with more interior connectivity and shorter boundaries will be weighted more highly than
those with spindly limbs and bottlenecks.86 To use MCMC for sampling, we run
chains for a long time as we endeavor to collect samples that are representative
of the target distribution. Eventually, the sample reaches stationarity: the “bell
curve” stops changing and a representative sample is achieved.
Though this is fast becoming the leading method of generating plans for
comparison, this was not always the mechanism of randomized redistricting—
and representative sampling was not always the goal. In the 1960s, early computer redistricting packages did not seek representativeness, but optimization.87
And even in the last ten years, quite a few political science publications88 and

84.

85.

86.

87.
88.

By definition, a Markov chain is a random walk without memory, meaning that the position
at time n+1 is governed by a probabilistic choice based only on the location at time n and not
on the previous history. Many kinds of dynamical system have steady states; Markov chains
are remarkable because, when designed carefully, there is a unique steady-state distribution
for the system, and the random walk process beginning at any initial configuration will always
converge to it. This means that the empirical distribution drawn from a large enough sample
of observations will converge to the same long-term shape, no matter what the initial position.
We discuss Markov chain theory in more detail infra Appendix A.1.
Charles J. Geyer, Introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo, in HANDBOOK OF MARKOV CHAIN
MONTE CARLO (Steve Brooks, Andrew Gelman, Galin L. Jones & Xiao-Li Meng, eds. 2011),
http://www.mcmchandbook.net/HandbookChapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5QX-34UY].
For an overview of court approaches to compactness before and during the Shaw line of cases,
see generally Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 484 (1993), which notes that compactness violations are found “[w]hen physical geography is stretched too thin.” For a discussion of how ReCom compactness fits into the legal
history, see Moon Duchin & Bridget Eileen Tenner, Discrete Geometry for Electoral Geography (Aug. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/1808.05860 [https://
perma.cc/G9XM-DCZJ].
Early work of this kind is cited by Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 882-85, though
perhaps without realizing that these 1960s examples are from a diﬀerent family of algorithms.
See sources cited supra note 82.
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expert reports89 have been based on a very diﬀerent style of district generation
that we will name a “Petri dish” method: the small units of a state are given initial
labels, and these proto-districts then merge and grow until they fill out the state
with the right number of districts, like bacteria cultures growing in a plate. To
create desired properties in the output plans, ad hoc adjustments are made to the
merging rules. The resulting plans come with no theory describing their distribution and their authors present no account of the extent to which one kind of
plan might tend to appear more often than another. For instance, a merging instruction meant to promote compactness could easily cause a certain two counties to be kept together in nearly every plan generated by the process, though
their association has nothing to do with compactness per se.
A big jump in sophistication from the Petri dish ensembles came with the
shift to MCMC, starting with the refinement of random walk methods based on
a “Flip” step. A Flip chain begins with a complete districting plan and alters it
slightly at each move, by reassigning one or a small number of its units. If carefully designed, Flip chains can have the property that they will converge in the
long term to a steady state.90 Let’s illustrate sampling by random walk with a
metaphor: imagine that you’re trying to survey a population of a hill-dwelling
people that live all over the world. So you would like to design a survey methodology that is somewhat weighted towards exploring at higher altitudes, but
that is capable of visiting every place in the world. The idea behind Markov chain
methods is that if a sampling agent begins at an arbitrary location and moves
around at random, they will eventually explore the full space—as long as their
movement is designed in such a way that it is possible to transit from any point
to any other point.91 Now suppose that there is just one narrow and long passageway from one part of the world to another. Then it is unlikely that a random
agent will quickly find the entrance and make it all the way through the passage

89.

“Petri dish” methods have been used by Dr. Chen in numerous court cases, including Common
Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 874-76 (M.D.N.C. 2018); LWV of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (No. 261 M.D. 2017); and Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D.
Wisc. 2016).
90. Since 2018, Chen has incorporated Flip chains into his expert work, but only in a hill-climbing
manner which is designed for optimization, not representative sampling. See, e.g., Rucho, 318
F. Supp. 3d; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. The work from the research teams of Duke’s Jonathan
Mattingly and Harvard’s Kosuke Imai is particularly notable in targeting a prescribed distribution. For an extended discussion of challenges and sophisticated fixes for Flip chains, see
Daryl DeFord & Moon Duchin, Random Walks and the Universe of Districting Plans, in POLITICAL GEOMETRY (Moon Duchin & Olivia Walch eds., forthcoming 2021), https://mggg.org
/gerrybook [https://perma.cc/LV7B-VCKN].
91. Indeed, the Markov chain theory goes much further than this: in many settings, it is possible
to get a representative sample far before you have explored the whole world. See infra Appendix A.1 for more information.
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to the other side. If you are able to wait long enough, you can be sure that the
full space will be thoroughly explored, but if you need an answer within a human
lifetime you may not be so lucky. Petri dish methods are akin to just asking your
friends if they know any members of our hill-dwelling tribe. Petri dish with hill
climbing is like asking your friends to go to their backyards and climb the nearest
hill looking for tribe members—note that this is the opposite of exploring widely,
because all the people who start near the slope will end up at the same place and
get stuck once there’s nowhere higher to climb. Flip chains are like sending out
agents to traverse the world on foot, making random moves in all directions.
Because of the existence of narrow passageways, Flip agents run the risk of getting stuck on islands for huge stretches of time, never getting lucky enough to
find the bridges and tunnels, which prevents them from exploring and taking a
true global random sample—and at the scale of a redistricting problem, this is
exactly what happens.92 The Recombination (or ReCom) algorithm used by
Chen and Stephanopoulos in the present Article was developed by the research
team of DeFord, Duchin, and Solomon to get around these bottlenecks. To continue our exploration metaphor, ReCom equips the random agent with a jetpack,
allowing such large moves all at once that it is possible to draw a sample in reasonable time that no longer shows dependence on the starting location of the
random agent. To return to somewhat more precise language: ReCom is a highly
eﬃcient graph algorithm that reassigns hundreds of units at each step. It targets
a global probability distribution on plans in which the likelihood of drawing a
particular valid districting plan is directly proportional to a certain explicit measure of compactness, with no dependence on hidden factors.93 This is a question
that one should ask of all algorithms: in making distinctions (in redistricting no
less than in assigning credit scores or recidivism risk), do the outputs depend
only on the legitimate inputs in transparent ways?
At first blush, the distributional question—how to weight possible plans
when sampling—might seem easy: simply take all valid plans and weight them

92.
93.

DeFord, Duchin & Solomon, supra note 10.
To be precise, the stationary probability of selecting a plan in the ReCom chain is approximately proportional to its spanning tree score, a measure of compactness that draws from
clustering theory. See DeFord, Duchin & Solomon, supra note 10 and Duchin & Tenner supra
note 86. A small adjustment to the Markov procedure makes the chain reversible and makes
it target exactly the spanning tree distribution. See Sarah Cannon, Moon Duchin, Dana Randall & Parker Rule, A Reversible Recombination Chain for Graph Partitions, METRIC GEOMETRY
& GERRYMANDERING GROUP (2020), https://mggg.org/ReCom [https://perma.cc/4WA4
-DPMT]. The simplicity for the modeler and the speed of heuristic convergence recommend
ReCom over Flip-based Markov chains. ReCom “is more computationally costly than Flip at
each step in the Markov chain, but this tradeoﬀ is net favorable thanks to superior convergence and distributional qualities.” This piece is not a suitable place for a full introduction to
these methods, but we refer the reader to DeFord & Duchin, supra note 90.
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equally. However, this does not work to produce good samples, because there
are astronomically more noncompact plans than compact ones. And we cannot
just threshold the allowed compactness; if all are weighted the same, virtually
the entire sample will be at the worst allowable level.94 While other preference
factors can be added to a ReCom run, having “eyeball” compactness fall in a reasonable range is built in. This means that compactness does not have to be manually thresholded as the authors do in the Article, where they reject plans in
which the average Polsby-Popper score of a district is even the slightest bit worse
than the enacted plan.95 Indeed, the authors begin with the algorithmic engine
of ReCom and add numerous flourishes that serve to negate its hard-won theoretical selling points.96 In particular, it is completely unclear what distribution
on districting plans they seek to sample from (i.e., how they aim to weight some
kinds of plans more than others), and indeed there is no indication that they are
attuned to the importance of that question.
In short, not all algorithms are created equal, and it is quite surprising to
read ReCom described by the authors as “a refined version of the redistricting
algorithm that one of us has developed in a series of expert engagements.”97
94.

Since noncompact plans are exponentially more numerous, the probability of selecting them
approaches 100% as the problem size expands. And in addition to being undesirable for compactness reasons, sampling from a uniform distribution has been proven to be computationally intractable. Lorenzo Najt, Daryl DeFord, and Justin Solomon have shown that if you
could create an algorithm that samples districting plans approximately uniformly, then you
have solved a suite of problems long believed to be impossible. In particular, the solution
would give you a way to crack internet encryption! Lorenzo Najt, Daryl DeFord & Justin Solomon, Complexity and Geometry of Sampling Connected Graph Partitions 1-2 (Aug. 23,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/1908.08881 [https://perma.cc/WZ8L
-Y39M].
95. No state law has a rule of this kind.
96. In particular, the authors clearly break the key property that sample statistics converge to the
same target distribution regardless of initial position. Here, desirable properties like compactness and county integrity are playing the role of altitude in our exploration metaphor; their
customizations to favor high altitude end up forbidding bridges altogether, and this literally
disconnects the landscape we are trying to explore—agents can no longer explore eﬀectively
in any amount of time. For details, see infra Appendix A.1 and Figure A5.
97. Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 882. Also “a modified version of a MCMC redistricting algorithm that one of us has previously employed in expert testimony.” Id. at 891. The
footnote in support of these claims says, of Chen’s prior methods: “Under this related approach, a recombination MCMC algorithm developed by one of us was used to create a single
map that satisfied the specified parameters. This process was repeated hundreds or thousands
of times to generate a large number of maps. In other words, the maps were the endpoints of
hundreds or thousands of separate Markov chains, not way-points along a single, very long
Markov chain.” There is simply no evidence of any setup that is capable of representative sampling in Chen’s earlier work. Since expert witnesses can certainly update their methods when
better ones become available, there is no need for this flagrantly misleading description. See
infra Appendix A.1 for more on Markov chain theory.
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iv. robustness and stability
In this Part, we set aside questions of what ensembles can properly do, turning to a narrower investigation of whether the Article’s particular ensemble design can produce reliable numerical findings that answer to their description.98
We start by overviewing the ensemble protocol. Then we isolate some serious
issues stemming from ecological inference—both how it is run and how it is used
to define a “minority opportunity district.” Finally, we investigate the possibility
of incorporating richer electoral history rather than basing the whole analysis on
Obama-Romney. We will use the Texas State House as our case study throughout this Part of the Response. We began with a dataset containing dozens of
statewide elections from the last Census cycle. From these, we selected nine elections to highlight (six generals and three Democratic primary or primary runoﬀ
elections). To emphasize probative elections, we ran ecological inference in the
“preferred” manner described below in Section IV.B and only considered elections in which the Black and Hispanic candidate of choice was very certain (identified in 100% of draws) and the two groups agreed. We additionally preferred
more recent elections, and those with a Black or Hispanic candidate on the ballot.99
Figure 4 shows estimated polarization levels in those elections, illustrating
that general elections have stark diﬀerences in White preferences compared to
Black and Hispanic preferences, while Democratic primaries are far less polarized, even when candidates of color are on the ballot. This underlines the importance of incorporating primary elections into the analysis; their dynamics are
quite diﬀerent from generals and no candidate can ultimately be elected without
first clearing a primary.

98.

We do not attempt to elaborate a complete alternative approach here. For a fully implemented
VRA protocol that works to avoid the issues we have flagged here, see Becker et al., supra note
9.
99. Id. (oﬀering several methods of combining elections).
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FIGURE 5.
racially polarized voting in texas100

A. Anatomy of the Methods
Modeling redistricting calls for operationalizing the rules—transforming legal
English into a form that can be handled by a computer—and this requires creativity and a suite of user choices. Working with electoral results also requires the
use of inference techniques, and inference brings error. Considering both user
choice and uncertainty, it is incumbent on the modeler to be vigilant to the ways
that error and instability can propagate, snowballing in magnitude, through the
steps of a workflow.

100.
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Figure 4 depicts the racial voting gap in nine elections over the 150 districts of the Texas House
of Representatives. Black and Hispanic voters agree on the candidate of choice in all nine elections. Each histogram plots the estimated diﬀerence between Black+Hispanic support for the
candidate of choice and White support using the “Preferred EI” method described in the text.
General elections show massive polarization of about sixty percentage points, while Democratic primaries and runoﬀs show broad agreement between White and minority voters. In
six of these elections (marked with *), the minority-preferred candidate is either Black or
Hispanic.
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TABLE 2.
survey of methods in the article for measuring whether minorities are
overrepresented or underrepresented with respect to the race-neutral
baseline
Step in Article Workflow

Discussion

Obtain election results on a shapefile with
block assignments.

Article sources this to DailyKos blog. Only
Obama-Romney election is
available. Unreliable shapefile will cause
error.

Join demographic data using decennial voting-age population (VAP) rather than citizen voting-age population (CVAP).

Article uses VAP for EI but compares
outcomes to CVAP proportionality.

Estimate voting behavior using ecological
inference. Set up racial groups as Black,
Hispanic, Other. Run EI on every county
separately, in two phases: one phase to
estimate turnout, then a second phase to
estimate candidate preference.

Point estimates are recorded without error bounds. By-county method exaggerates EI problems with small counts. Many
racial categories (Asian, Two or more
races, etc.) are combined with White vote,
no matter the group voting preferences,
which will have major impacts in some
states.

Break down votes to census blocks.

Has potential to introduce substantial
error.

Create units called “base polygons” for
building plans.

Article uses Census Places shapefile to
represents municipalities and reverseengineers units from these. Unclear if ad
hoc building blocks influence findings.

Designate tight threshold criteria: county
splitting, place splitting, Polsby-Popper, and
population deviation are better than or equal
to enacted plan.

It is clear that other ways of operationalizing the rules, or the use of softer validity
conditions, would lead to different
findings.

Create seed plans that pass threshold tests.

Only one see plan is used for each case
with no method presented for its
generation.

Attempt 10,000,000+ steps to recombine
the “base polygons,” only accepting new
plans that meet threshold criteria.

No discussion of connectivity of search
space or convergence of summary
statistics.

Pass over 100,000 plans (“burn-in”), then
save every 10,000th accepted step (“subsampling”) to create an ensemble of size
1000.

Generous burn-in and sub-sampling
combine to make the ultimate ensemble
very small. 1000 observations is far too
few to estimate a histogram on over 100
bins.
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For each district, if Black voters preferred
Obama to Romney and Hispanic voters
preferred Obama to Romney, then count the
district as a MOD if Black+Hispanic Obama
voters outnumber White+Other Obama
voters.

Defensible but not authoritative
definition of a VRA-relevant district.
Alternative definitions lead to different
findings. Strict inequality applied to EI
outputs leads to instability.

For each districting plan, count its number
of MODs. Record the median number over
the 1000 plans as the MNMOD.

A great deal of ensemble information is
lost

Say that minorities are “overrepresented”
(resp., “under-represented”) in a plan if the
number of MOD is greater (resp., less) than
the MNMOD.

Median is treated as a precise target and
finally called “the race-neutral baseline.”

In Table 2 we set out the step-by-step procedure that leads from raw data to
the findings that the authors call “overrepresentation” or “underrepresentation.”
The purpose of the table is to make invisible modeling choices visible. To be
clear, every sophisticated modeling eﬀort has many moving parts, and the point
here is not to critique the level of complexity, but rather to examine the decision
junctures. Errors and arbitrary choices risk compounding throughout the entire
workflow to accumulate in the final project. This is why responsible mathematical modeling always includes a sensitivity analysis, showing whether the findings are stable or variable as the settings are tweaked.
Chen and Stephanopoulos’s definition of minority opportunity districts has
two components: “(Obama win): Obama got more votes than Romney in 2012”;
and “(Group control) Obama garnered more votes from minority voters than
from White voters,” with various additional cases when Black or Hispanic voters
do not prefer Obama to Romney.101 The logic of this particular construction is

101.
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To give their fuller description, “we define an opportunity district as one where (1) the minority-preferred candidate wins the general [Obama-Romney] election, and (2) minority voters who support the minority-preferred candidate outnumber white voters backing that candidate, provided that (3) minority voters of diﬀerent racial groups are aggregated only if each
group favors the same candidate.” Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 899. The data
demonstrations in this Part are based on applying their definition in full, after correcting small
coding errors. See infra Appendix A.2. In their data, the groups considered are Black, Hispanic,
and Other, a category that includes everyone else—White, Asian, two or more races, and so
on. We found that the eﬀects of replacing this super-category with only non-Hispanic White
voters amount to about a one-seat diﬀerence in the Texas House, but the eﬀect size would
surely be higher in other parts of the country. In particular, three of the states treated in the
Article (CA, NV, NY) are at or near 10% Asian population share, and Asian voters are far more
likely to align with Black and Hispanic than White voters. See Christopher S. Elmendorf &
Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the VRA After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 2143, 2210-11 (2015).
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defensible but hardly authoritative. Even so, this definition of MOD could be
useful in broad strokes for determining whether minority plaintiﬀs might have
a legal right to additional representation. To see this we will investigate the robustness of the findings.
B. The Racial Inference in the “Race-Blind” Protocol
A workflow in which the output of each step is fed, without calibration, into
the next risks becoming a Rube Goldberg machine. Each part may be in working
order, but the string of tenuous transitions creates precarity for the whole apparatus. And in this case, there is a method at the center of the machine that on its
own has the capacity to destabilize the whole enterprise.
Ecological inference is the industry standard technique—or more properly,
family of techniques—for relating demographics to voting history in geographic
units. Since EI itself is stochastic,102 one way to probe robustness is simply to
rerun the code. For example, Chen and Stephanopoulos report that there are
twenty-eight Hispanic opportunity districts and eighteen Black opportunity districts in the Texas state House, respectively. We ran their EI code for Texas two
additional times exactly as written, using their own data.103 The first rerun reported twenty-seven and eighteen; the second found twenty-six and twenty.104
The main driver of this instability is group control, the second element in the
authors’ definition of MOD, which uses vote-by-race estimates in a hard-edged
way (i.e., with a strict inequality). Besides disregarding uncertainty, the authors’
protocol uses separate EI runs on every county, as opposed to running one
statewide model. In Texas, for example, there are 254 counties, and fifty of them
have a 2010 Census population of under 5,000 people.105 Ecological inference,
like ecological regression and all other inference techniques used for this purpose, gives very unreliable estimates for small sub-populations. In their more-

102.

GARY KING, ORI ROSEN & MARTIN A. TANNER, ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE: NEW METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 7-10 (2004)
103. Jowei Chen, Data Files, Replication Code, and Simulated Districting Plans, U. MICH., http://
www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/race [https://perma.cc/MFN5-RERB].
104. Compare this to Figure 5, in which their style of ecological interference (EI) reports forty-four
or forty-five minority opportunity districts (MODs). As compared to their Article, which reports forty-six MODs, our districting ensemble in Figure 5 was generated using Texas Legislative Council precinct units rather than the custom units from the replication materials,
which may account for the discrepancy.
105. See Estimates of the Total Populations of Counties and Places in Texas for July 1, 2019 and January
1, 2020, TEX. DEMOGRAPHIC CTR. tbl.1 (2020), https://demographics.texas.gov/Resources
/TPEPP/Estimates/2019/2019_txpopest_county.pdf [https://perma.cc/28XU-LD9H].
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is-better approach, Chen and Stephanopoulos push their EI right to, and even
past, its known limitations.106
Besides their choice to run by county rather than statewide, they use VAP
(voting age population) and not CVAP (citizen voting age population), even
though CVAP is clearly the litigation standard when working with Hispanic
VRA claims in particular. They use a two-phase method, with a first run to estimate turnout and a second run (using only expectation and not uncertainty from
the first) to estimate candidate preference. A conceptually cleaner and far more
reliable approach is to create a dummy candidate called “Abstain” to account for
nonvoters. A single phase of EI then gives estimates for both turnout and candidate choice; the advantage of this approach is that all data is taken into account
in the same model run. Finally, in precincts where the number of votes exceeds
the VAP, they scale the vote down to match the VAP, as opposed to more intuitive
options like scaling the population up to match the votes or creating a buﬀer
column to avoid scaling at all.
As we illustrate in columns (2)-(4) of Figure 5, these innocuous-sounding
choices can have a massive eﬀect, especially in combination. These simple toggles can make the number of MODs measured in the enacted plan vary from 34 to
51.107
(2) Unstable EI = By-county / VAP / two-phase / buﬀer
(3) Article EI = By-county / VAP / two-phase / scale votes
(4) Preferred EI = Statewide / CVAP / one-phase / scale population
The X symbols in columns (2)-(4) mark the outputs to the question, “How
many minority opportunity districts in the enacted Texas House plan?” that are
observed by simply running the identical EI script twenty times and applying
the Chen-Stephanopoulos definition. Then, the same EI values that reported the
highest and lowest static count are applied to count MODs in the ensemble of
two million plans. The authors show this as a test of their hypothesis that any
quirk that elevates the MOD count in the enacted plan would similarly elevate
the ensemble.108 As we see, this is not the case.

106.

Figure A3 shows that this makes a major diﬀerence! The by-county run reports implausibly
lukewarm Black support for Obama. We further note that statewide EI, run in the hierarchical
Bayesian style, produces estimates by precinct and is perfectly capable of detecting regional
diﬀerences.
107. As it happens, the highest estimate both uses the settings we think are conceptually preferred
and is the best match to recent ground truth of House district election patterns in Texas.
“Ground truthing” the outputs will be discussed further infra Section IV.3.
108. See supra note 16.
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FIGURE 5.
checking the robustness of “opportunity”109

109.

Figure 5 depicts a comparison for TX House (150 districts) based on applying various counting questions to a single precinct-level ensemble of two million plans. Radii of colored disks
are proportional to the frequency with which an outcome was observed in the ensemble;
bracket (X) marks the number of each kind of district in the currently enacted plan. The definition of MOD begins with an Obama win as in (1) and layers a group control requirement
on top. (2)-(4) show that this group control condition depends heavily on the way EI is run.
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C. Turning the Knobs
The choice of EI is not the only proverbial “knob to turn” in the machine we
are studying. We focus on one other crucial ingredient in this Part—the electoral
history that must be central in any reasonable determination of eﬀective “opportunity”—and then briefly discuss an evaluation of outputs against the ground
truth of Texas House district performance. Another crucial modeling choice,
how to model a preference for keeping counties and municipalities whole, is deferred to infra Appendix A.4.
Every column in Figure 5 uses the same large ensemble of two million alternative 150-district Texas plans, made with whole precincts as building blocks so
that electoral data is handled with a minimum of error.110 By holding the twomillion-map sample of plans constant and only changing what kind of district is
being counted, we can isolate the ways that altering the definition and measurement of minority opportunity districts can significantly shift the findings.
The left-most column shows that fifty-four out of the 150 districts in the enacted Texas House plan had more Obama votes than Romney votes in 2012, and
that this is fully normal with respect to the comparator ensemble of alternative
plans made with no partisan or racial data. Statewide, Obama received almost
exactly 42% of the major-party vote share. The conversion of this spatial pattern
of support to an outcome where Obama wins 36% of districts appears to be fully
normal with respect to the randomized redistricting alternatives.
And it is this Obama electoral success on which the Chen-Stephanopoulos
definition of minority opportunity is built. Every Texas district that they identified as an MOD qualifies because it has an Obama majority and has more estimated votes from Black and/or Hispanic voters than from white/other voters.
Additionally, though it is not visible in the figure, they aﬃx a binary label of
Black opportunity or Hispanic opportunity simply based on which group is estimated to have cast more votes for Obama.
As we discussed above, the EI used to enforce “group control” for minority
voters is then layered on top of the first counting question. A richer dataset could
certainly be used as the basis of measuring electoral success, rather than the
Obama reelection data alone. For this purpose, we note that it is important to
use statewide elections, but there is no reason to demand that the same elections
be used across states; on the contrary, the best practice would clearly be to use as
many statewide elections as possible.
(5)-(7) compare starting points with broader electoral history as an alternative to relying on
the vote pattern from a single election.
110. ReCom always finds contiguous plans and places a heavy preference on compact plans. In
these runs, we allow districts to deviate by no more than 5% from ideal population, and we
collect every accepted plan into the ensemble (no burn-in, no sub-sampling).
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Columns (5)-(7) of Figure 5 explore the number of districts won by minority
candidates of choice for diﬀerent mixes of election contests. We see in column
(5) that an Obama win is highly predictive of a win for the Democrat (who in
each case is the candidate of choice for both Black and Latino voters) in the five
other general elections considered here. However, primary elections behave
quite diﬀerently. Column (6) shows that the Black and Latino candidate of
choice has the most votes in the Democratic primary in 64 districts in the currently enacted plan, which is still in the normal range but no longer falls above
the ensemble average. Finally, since electoral opportunity requires that candidates of choice first advance from primaries and then prevail in general elections,
we count how many districts have seen success for the minority candidate of
choice in at least two of three primaries and at least four of six generals.111
So, how should we ultimately set the knobs on our machine? The decision
should consider stability and replicability, but must also be made in view of the
available ground truth provided by recent district performance. We can examine
exactly which current enacted districts are not labeled MODs by the Article’s
method, but have a rock-solid recent history of opportunity for minority candidates of choice. One clear category is urban-proximal districts with significant
White crossover support, such as HD 46, 49, 50, and 51 in Travis County, home
to Austin. District 46 is currently represented by Sheryl Cole, who is Black, and
the only candidates who have won or even received strong vote support in the
full ten-year cycle are Cole, Jose Vela, and Dawnna Dukes—all clearly minoritypreferred.112 The fact that the Chen-Stephanopoulos definition of MOD systematically disqualifies districts of this kind should be a signal that it would be wise
to soften its handling of “group control.”
conclusion: the algorithmic future
From predictive policing to smart cars to medical diagnosis, algorithmic assistance is becoming ensconced in every area of public and private life. As the
science that is relevant to law and governance gets closer to the research frontier,
skillful mathematical modeling will become indispensable for policymakers.
As an example, consider the disclosure avoidance measures being advanced
by the Census Bureau. Title 13 of the U.S. Code requires the Bureau to take

111.

Here we are only trying to illustrate that more electoral results can easily be incorporated. See
Becker et al., supra note 9, for several workable methods of combining many statewide elections to create an overall index of electoral success.
112. See Texas House of Representatives District 46, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Texas
_House_of_Representatives_District_46 [https://perma.cc/YF4V-V32J].
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measures to protect the privacy of respondents’ data.113 In the 2010 Census, this
was achieved by an ad hoc mechanism: a Bureau employee manually swapped
data between small census blocks to thwart identifiability. In 2020, this is no
longer adequate to protect from increasingly sophisticated reidentification attacks.114 With this threat in mind, the Bureau has turned to a “diﬀerentially private” noising algorithm called TopDown, following a concept recently introduced
by academic computer scientists.115 To analyze the potential for diﬀerential impacts of these privacy strategies on marginalized populations—and indeed on
VRA enforcement!—there is no reasonable alternative to collaboration. Computer scientists and mathematicians who are at the research forefront, geographers who understand Census data, social scientists and litigators who use Census data, and organizers who mobilize Census response will need to work
together, since the technique itself is novel and the use case is full of special complexities. We would go so far as to suggest that it would be a serious mistake for
litigators who take on issues regarding privatized data to rely exclusively on established networks of experts.
This moment, when cutting-edge scientific computation is becoming unavoidably implicated in many domains of law, requires sweeping reforms to legal
training, legal publication, and the recruitment and development of litigation
experts. Law students of the twenty-first century should be conversant with
probability, statistics, and an introduction to algorithms. Legal publications that
draw on technical material should be refereed by competent domain experts, and
expert reports should be held to high modeling standards, including scientific
norms of well-documented software and replicable findings. Courts are unlikely
to remain satisfied by the mere invocation of “an algorithm” of even just “a computer program” that takes the appropriate criteria into account in some way.

113.

13 U.S.C. § 9 (2018).
In such an attack, an adversary uses a simple computational technique to reconstruct the Census person-by-person data file and then pairs it with commercially available data to match
names, phone numbers, and addresses with all the information included on the Census form.
See Disclosure Avoidance and the 2020 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/about/policies/privacy/statistical_safeguards/disclosure-avoidance-2020-census.html
[https://perma.cc/AGX2-88RA]; Michael Hawes, Diﬀerential Privacy and the 2020 Decennial
Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www2.census.gov/about/policies/2020
-03-05-diﬀerential-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF97-RCND].
115. John Abowd, Robert Ashmead, Simson Garfinkel, Daniel Kifer, Philip Leclerc, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Brett Moran, William Sexton, Pavel Zhuravlev, Census TopDown: Diﬀerentially Private Data, Incremental Schemas, and Consistency with Public Knowledge (Nov. 14,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://github.com/uscensusbureau/census2020-das-2010
ddp/blob/master/doc/20191020_1843_Consistency_for_Large_Scale_Diﬀerentially
_Private_Histograms.pdf [https://perma.cc/V888-VLSK].
114.

782

models, race, and the law

By the same token, it is essential to create pathways for STEM researchers to
get serious training in the humanities and social sciences. This will enable modelers and software engineers to build tools that answer to the needs of law and
policy—and to understand their limitations. The scientific publication ecosystem, which in many fields has ossified around the major application domains of
the mid-twentieth century, would benefit enormously from new journals that
take social, legal, and civil rights applications seriously. And above all, we should
all be collaborating more.
In the end, we find ourselves in resounding agreement with Chen and Stephanopoulos when they describe ensemble methods as the “most important development in recent memory” in election law.116 But rather than handing us singlestatistic indicators, ensembles are better used to find baseline ranges and quantify tradeoﬀs, highlighting the properties entailed or promoted by the rules and
helping to flag extreme outliers. For ensembles to gain traction in VRA litigation
and beyond, it is crucial that researchers are transparent about their design
choices: modeling methods must be discussed and justified “above the line,” and
ideas for operationalizing vernacular rules and priorities should share billing
with the ultimate findings. From a voting-rights perspective, the stakes could
scarcely be higher, as a newly reinvigorated conservative Court gears up to take
on the Voting Rights Act at the dawn of a new census and redistricting cycle.
By hiding complexity and contingency, The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights
creates an appearance of definitiveness for its account of a race-neutral baseline
suited to a minimalist Voting Rights Act. The risks of this illusion are serious.
When the Court needs a standard to meet its aims, it has been known to reach
right into the academic literature; in fact, the Gingles factors that completely reconfigured the landscape of VRA enforcement were lifted not from a legal brief
but straight from the 1982 law review article of Blacksher and Menefee.117
Because the definitions of district eﬀectiveness track contested normative
ideals, some of the work to be done is conceptual. At the same time, the data and
statistical requirements for this ambitious project—studying the interactions of
human geography and plurality districts in the context of voting rights law—will
require many hands on deck and significant further work before researchers converge on a robust and widely applicable protocol that reflects the complexity of
the use case. We are optimistic that the Article’s bold and provocative proof of
concept will inspire just that kind of follow-on work.

116.

Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 5, at 866.

117.

See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (citing Blacksher & Menefee, supra note
63, for each of the three threshold factors and thirteen times overall).
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appendix
A.1. Markov Chain Principles
The Fundamental Theorem of Markov Chains says that any Markov chain
that is “ergodic” has a unique stationary distribution. The Markov Chain Central
Limit Theorem ensures that if you collect a large enough sample from a suitably
designed chain, you will get a reliable estimator for statistics on the state
space.118 These two results are the core theoretical selling points for applying
MCMC to benchmark the baseline behavior for neutral districting plans.
Ergodicity, a hypothesis needed to secure these fundamental convergence
and estimation results, requires that your elementary move—in our case, a recombination move that merges two districts and partitions them a new way—
can reach any plan in your state space if run for long enough from any starting
location. In other words, your state space must be path-connected. Sometimes
the moves are designed to target a pre-set distribution, and other times a description can be attempted post hoc.
ReCom is designed to approximately target a particular distribution on districting plans, namely the “spanning tree distribution,” in which the probability
of choosing a particular plan is proportional to a certain compactness score.119
That's it—if you want to know how much more likely one plan is to be selected
than another, you compute this spanning tree compactness score for both plans.
If Plan A has a score twice as high as Plan B, it is twice as likely to be selected.120
To be clear, none of this theory applies to “Petri dish” methods of district generation. Petri dish plans are perfectly respectable for example generation, but support no statistical claims. Likewise, hill-climbing algorithms (those that only accept a map with a score better than or equal to the previous one) will fail to be
ergodic because they get stuck at local maxima. They are designed for heuristic
optimization, not for representative sampling.121

118.

Charles J. Geyer, Introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo, in HANDBOOK OF MARKOV CHAIN
MONTE CARLO (Steve Brooks, Andrew Gelman, Galin L. Jones & Xiao-Li Meng, eds. 2011),
http://www.mcmchandbook.net/HandbookChapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N5X-ZRPL].
119. See Duchin & Tenner, supra note 86.
120. See Cannon et al., supra note 93 (finding that by making a small change to ReCom, a reversible
chain is obtained that exactly targets this distribution.
121. As to the rebranding of earlier methods as “a recombination MCMC algorithm,” every expert
report and publication of Dr. Chen’s uses either a Petri dish method or, from 2018 onwards, a
series of hill-climbing Flip runs. Indeed, the word “optimize” appears repeatedly; there are no
occurrences of “recombination” or “spanning tree” and there is no discussion of convergence
or the relative weighting of plans. See, e.g., Expert Report of Jowei Chen, Common Cause v.
Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C.) (No. 1:16-CV-1026), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018);
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In the construction of the ReCom algorithm, we treat population balance
and contiguity as basic and non-negotiable requirements of redistricting. Contiguity does not have to be enforced by ReCom because it is an automatic consequence of its merge and split procedure. But we address population balance with
a validity check: when a move is attempted, it can only be accepted if it has population deviation no greater than some user-chosen threshold. Any hard requirement like this that prevents the random walker from advancing can be called a
“rejection filter” in the procedure.
Rejection filters should be used with great caution. A threshold set too tight
can disconnect the state space entirely, making it impossible to transition between some two plans by a sequence that passes the threshold test at all intermediate steps.122 In the disconnected case, the sample that is collected can only
tell you statistics of the component containing your starting point, which may
be a small and non-representative corner of the state space. And even when you
don't fully disconnect the space, imposing strict conditions can create “bottlenecks” that make it hard to transit the space. (For instance, it could be possible
to get between some two parts of the space, but only by choosing some very
unlikely sequence of steps in a particular order.)
In scientific applications, it can be hard to know whether you have imposed
conditions that cause your random walker to get stuck. A standard trial used to
raise confidence that the random walker is exploring eﬀectively is called the
multi-start heuristic: run the chain from very diﬀerent starting positions, and see
if you collect comparable statistics. If not, you can be sure that your runs are too
short or your space is disconnected.
The Chen–Stephanopoulos protocol imposes numerous stringent and arguably superfluous requirements: a hard limit requiring that the average PolsbyPopper score be less than or equal to the enacted plan (layered on top of the
ReCom preference for compactness); a hard limit requiring that any new plan
has at least as many fully intact counties as the enacted plan; and a requirement
that any two districts to be merged by the procedure must share a county between them. Imposing the last requirement (see Figure A1) unquestionably disconnects the search space; any district made of whole counties can never be altered. It also clearly ensures that the spanning tree distribution is no longer a
steady state.

Expert Report of Jowei Chen, Ph.D., Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-jdp (W.D. Wis. Oct. 15,
2018); sources cited supra note 82.
122. If (reversible) ReCom is run with rejection filters that maintain the ability to transit between
any two states, then the resulting stationary distribution will be the spanning tree distribution
on the restricted state space.
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FIGURE A1.
code snippet: counties123

In addition, they choose a very high subsampling parameter, waiting for
10,000 accepted steps before adding any new plan to the ensemble. Subsampling
is essential for MCMC methods invoking physics-inspired techniques like temperature variation, as in the past redistricting work of Mattingly and Imai,124
because it skips over “hot” plans that may not pass the validity requirements. But
we know of no argument for subsampling with a ReCom chain, where all plans
pass validity checks. In this setting, subsampling needlessly throws information
away. To quote from the Handbook of MCMC, “Subsampling cannot improve
the accuracy of MCMC approximation; it must make things worse.”125
To summarize the most serious problems we find with Article's sampling
protocol:
•
•
•

123.

Overzealous subsampling (every 10,000th map) leads to samples
that are far too small (1000) to estimate a full distribution.
Numerous rejection conditions (e.g., Polsby-Popper, intact counties) and no multi-start heuristics raise concerns of bottlenecks and
disconnection.
Only allowing merging for districts that share a county between
them skews the sampling distribution in an uncontrolled manner
and creates strong dependence on the initial starting point for a
chain.

The code snippet that selects districts to be merged, which we have run through a Java formatter for legibility. Two districts can only be merged if a county is split between them.
124. See supra note 90.
125. See Geyer, supra note 118, at 27.
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Finally, it is not clear what the authors intended to demonstrate with the “alternative methodology” oﬀered in their Appendix D. There, they present an experiment in which even 100 rather than 1000 points pulled from a ReCom distribution will give the same median value, whether created along one long chain
or 100 individual ones. If this tells us anything about the present application, it
lends support to the idea that ReCom converges quickly to a stationary distribution on its component of the state space. That is, assuming the individual runs
were shorter than the single run, this demonstration supports the long-standing
claims about the eﬃciency of ReCom but only amplifies, rather than assuages,
worries that the random walker in the Chen–Stephanopoulous experiments
might be stuck in a small component of the state space. As we will see below in
Figure A5, those worries are warranted.
A.2. The Code Itself
The authors’ codebase uses a mix of R (for EI) and Java (for ensembles). As
we were repeatedly reminded during our replication work, even one line of
buggy code can compromise an entire data operation. As one small indication,
Figure A2 shows a minor error in their MOD definition logic. In principle, a
glitch like this could throw the analysis way oﬀ, though in practice this particular
error is buried in a rare case (where minority voters prefer Romney to Obama)
and may have little to no impact on findings.
But what about the diﬃcult part of the code, where the graph algorithm is
implemented? Because the code is sparsely commented and the replication materials come with no unit tests or examples, it becomes formidably diﬃcult to
analyze it in detail. This is even true when a high-level data team has several
months to develop a replication study like the present one; now imagine a litigation context, where a similar codebase is turned over to opposing attorneys
who have only two weeks to examine it. The chances that the code can be confirmed to perform as advertised are essentially zero.
The MGGG Redistricting Lab oﬀers open-source, publicly accessible implementations of ReCom in Python and Julia with extensive documentation;126 the
contributors and users include students, faculty, redistricting practitioners, and
professional developers. This is a case in which it should be a relatively easy decision to use widely reviewed code with a multi-year track record rather than a
homemade alternative.

126.

See GitHub, supra note 72.
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FIGURE A2.
code snippet: mod 127

A.3. Running EI on Each County
In Part IV, we noted that running EI separately on each of the 254 counties in
Texas might sound powerful, but is actually inadvisable because it leans into EI’s
known diﬃculties dealing with small sub-populations. For instance, Andrews,
Dawson, Martin, and Gaines are a cluster of demographically similar counties in
West Texas with a combined population of around 50,000 people. It stands to
reason that EI will handle them better together than individually, because there
will be more varied precinct data on which to base the model inferences.

127.

788

Code snippet to identify “minority opportunity districts,” separated and commented for readability. Black and Hispanic opportunity districts are defined for object “ag” (an aggregate of
precinct-level vote estimates) by multivariate compound statements; in the circled expressions, DEMS should be replaced by REPS to match the description in the Article.
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FIGURE A3.
estimated black support for obama across texas precincts128

And, perhaps surprisingly, this particular toggle in the settings matters quite
a bit. Figure A3 shows that changing from “Preferred EI” in only this way causes
a huge change in the inferred Black support for Obama across precincts. Instead
of estimates of precinct-level Black support for Obama uniformly near 90%, bycounty runs report a significant share of precincts with 40-60% support. As a
point of comparison, the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey found
that support for Obama among non-Hispanic Black voters in Texas was over
90%.129

128.

The estimate of Black voters’ support for Obama in each precinct as we toggle only the
statewide/by-county setting for EI. The scatterplot shows the 9,082 precincts of Texas.
Statewide EI, as in the “Preferred” style, reports high levels of Obama support; running the
same script looped over the individual countries, as in the Article, reports a large share of
precincts where Black voters are roughly evenly split between Obama and Romney, which
seems fairly implausible.
129. Stephen Ansolabehere & Brian Schaﬀner, CCES Common Content, 2012, HARV. DATAVERSE,
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HQEVPK [https://perma.cc/KGR5-29U2] (vote validated
dataset, variables = race, hispanic, inputstate and CC410a). Estimated support is 94.7%, with a
95% confidence interval of [90.8, 97.3] based on an exact binomial test.
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A.4. Interpreting Criteria in Ensemble-Generation
In Part IV we discussed the impact of “turning the knobs” related to EI and
use of additional statewide electoral data to define minority opportunity districts. Another crucial modeling choice centers interpreting the traditional criterion of respecting political boundaries, such as counties and municipalities, by
trying to minimize the extent to which those units are split by district lines.
A.4.1.

County-Conscious Sampling

County preservation is a reasonable priority in Texas because a corresponding rule is found in Article 3, § 26 of the state’s constitution. County preservation
is not a named priority in several other states in the Article.130 Nevertheless, the
authors implement a uniform county filter across every state. And the filter is
extremely strict; we will see that it categorically blocks the random walker from
making changes in most of rural Texas, so nearly all variation is in the urban
counties.
There are many ways of handling county splits, and several are compared in
Figure A4. We generate seven diﬀerent ensembles for this figure with one million plans each, using diﬀerent methods that either use weighting or rejection
filters to accomplish greater county integrity. Column (1) shows an ordinary
ReCom ensemble made with no attention to county lines. Column (2) implements the requirement that any merged districts must share a county (as in Figure 6). Column (3) implements the rejection filter that blocks new plans with
even one more county split than the enacted plan. And column (4) combines
both (2) and (3), as in the Article. Columns (5) and (6) use a softer method to
weight in favor of county integrity: after two districts have been merged,
ReCom draws a spanning tree of the double-district to cut it in two in a new
way. One can assign random weights to the edges and use a fast algorithm to
find a minimum spanning tree (MST). A soft way to favor county integrity is to
put slightly higher random weights on the edges within counties, so that a minimum spanning tree is likely to include between-county edges and therefore
likely to divide along a county line. Column (5) shows the outcome if the withincounty edges are given weights in (1.1, 2.1) while the between-county edges have
weights from (1, 2); column (6) bumps the within-county weights to the (2, 3)
range for a stronger eﬀect. Finally, column (7) applies a diﬀerent rejection filter,
restricting the number of county pieces. That is, the intact-county filter in (3)
only asks whether a county is divided, but does not measure the number of divisions.
130.
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See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE A4.
comparing county filters131

131.

These are many ways of handling a county criterion. Each column shows an ensemble of
100,000 maps, counting the number of House districts with more Obama than Romney
votes. Given this variability, it would be reasonable to declare that 51-57 Obama districts, or
even 50-58, is the normal range. It is far less reasonable to declare 54 as the median—and
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In large counties like Dallas County and Harris County, which are larger than
a congressional district, the intact-county filter would make no distinction between touching three districts or 30. The pieces filter restricts the number of
fragments in the plan overall to no more than the number in the enacted plan.
Scanning the outputs, it is striking that the approaches that most skew the
Obama count are the ones that impose rejection filters alone, (3) and (7), and
they push the count in opposite directions. This oﬀers a strong reminder that
each state’s rules should be handled with care and reinforces a theme that
emerges throughout our study of the Article's methods: graduated eﬀects should
be preferred to binary yes/no eﬀects when dealing with matters of degree.
A.4.2.

Impacts on Ensemble Geography

In Figure A5 we present a series of heatmaps that show how many times each
precinct in Texas changes its district assignment across a run of one million steps
with varying criteria, with yellow as the highest frequency and blue as the lowest.
In the top row we run ReCom with no county filter as in Figure A4(1) and observe that precincts flip to diﬀerent districts across the state. In the next rows we
impose the tree-weighting scheme described above, as in columns (5)–(6) from
the last figure. The eﬀects are quite visible compared to ordinary ReCom, especially in North Texas where counties follow a grid pattern—now we can see
whole rural counties flipping together. We note that a stronger weighting factor
produces crisper county lines, but still allows widespread changes. Each of the
weighting methods, like ordinary ReCom, leads to a visually indistinguishable
heatmap whether the chain was run from the enacted plan or from an alternate
random seed.132
Finally, we compare to ensembles created with the strict double-layered
county filter just as Chen and Stephanopoulos use it in their Article (Figure
A4(4), combining (2) and (3)). The results are quite stark: most of the state is
completely untouched by their randomization of districts, even after a million
steps, staying exactly as it was in the initial plan. The most-flipped precincts are
hard to see in a map of the state because they are so concentrated in Dallas/Fort
Worth, San Antonio, and Houston. And even after one million steps, the chains
that were run from diﬀerent initial starting points are producing visibly diﬀerent
patterns. This finding presents conclusive evidence that there are large areas in

declare a plan with55 such seats to “overrepresent” minorities—which would be the conclusion
from the method in the Article.
132. Multiple seed plans are available in our replication materials. Models-Race-Law, GITHUB
https://github.com/mggg/models-race-law [https://perma.cc/KR3G-86Y3].
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the universe of legally valid districting plans for the Texas House that their ensembles never visit.133

133.

We confirmed that this is true for their actual ensembles used in their analysis as well as for
our reconstructions of their method. Demonstrations can be found in our replication materials.
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FIGURE A5.
visualizing the diversity of samples134

134.
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Heatmap of Texas precincts, showing how many times they change district assignment over
a run of one million steps. The Chen-Stephanopoulos method does not explore this eﬀectively.
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A.4.3.

Municipalities

A municipality preservation rule is also imposed in the Article, again with a
hard threshold. This does not match up with the ex ante rules for redistricting
in Texas or in most other states in the authors’ sample. Of the nineteen states in
the study, only three (AZ,135 CA,136 SC137) mention cities as such in their redistricting rules, and four (DE,138 IL,139 NV,140 VA141) have no rule at all regarding
counties, municipalities, or any political boundaries.
The authors’ style of operationalizing municipality preservation is interesting enough to merit discussion. In many states, there is no authoritative source
to find boundaries for relevant municipal geographies. In order to build an approach across states, the authors turn to a Census data product called Census
Places.142 These include not only “Incorporated Places” like cities and towns, but
also “Census-Designated Places” like Native American reservations and various
land use areas that are chosen by the Census Bureau, not the state, as being appropriate for statistical tabulation.

135.
136.

137.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

AZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(E) (“To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible
geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts.”).
CA. CONST. art. 21, § 2(d)(4) (“The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county,
local neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the
preceding subdivisions.”).
2011 Redistricting Guidelines, S.C. SENATE (Apr. 13, 2011), redistricting.scsenate.gov
/Documents/RedistrictingGuidelinesAdopted041311.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRV7-CHTJ];
2011 Guidelines and Criteria for Congressional and Legislative Redistricting, S.C. HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMM., redistricting.schouse.gov/6334-1500-2011-Redistricting-Guidelines-(A0404871).pdf
[https://perma.cc/FAC5-NY72].
See supra note 14.
See supra note 15.
Justin Levitt, Nevada, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING (2020), redistricting.lls.edu/state/nevada
[https://perma.cc/DV4T-ZAW3].
Justin Levitt, Virginia, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING (2020), redistricting.lls.edu/state/virginia
[https://perma.cc/V846-AHEP].
Census Places are described in Chapter 9 of the Geographic Areas Reference Manual. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL ch. 9 (2020), www2.census.gov
/geo/pdfs/reference/GARM/Ch9GARM.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XSW-J6HE].
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FIGURE A6.143
census places

Figure A6 shows Census Places statewide and in a Fort Worth inset, showing
that the Places can include strands and spurs and empty loops. The authors make
their technique municipality-conscious in two ways, both extremely strong. One
is to impose another rejection filter that requires accepted plans to have at least
as many intact Places as the enacted plan. The second is a fundamental shift
whose impacts are hard to understand completely. They do not build their plans
out of whole precincts, as we do in our replication runs. Instead, they create novel
geographic units that they call “base polygons,” defined as intersections of block
groups and Places.
These choices—new building blocks, yet another rejection filter—certainly
could have a major impact on the findings, and they are not justified in the Article or well-tailored to state law.
We stand to learn a great deal from continued investigations that meet the
highest standards of data science while staying grounded in the details and the
meaning of the law.

143.
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Left: places in shapefile Texas. Right: a close up of the Fort Worth area.
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